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HOW DOES A FISCAL REFORM AFFECT ELASTICITIES OF INCOME TAX 
REVENUES? THE CASE OF SPAIN, 2003-2008 
 
 
1.  INTRODUCTION  
The observation of simple data may sometimes lead to misleading conclusions. In its 
2002 Annual Report on Tax Revenues the Spanish National Tax Agency (hereafter referred 
to by its Spanish acronym “AT”) showed a negative elasticity of income tax revenues with 
respect to GDP growth in 1999. The simple ratio between the growth rate in income tax 
revenues and the growth rate in GDP led to this conclusion in a year when a tax cutting 
fiscal reform took place. On this basis, elasticities below 1 would also be expected in years 
such as 1998, 2000 and 2007. However, these two facts are in conflict with the standard 
characterization of income tax as a progressive tax, through which increases in income result 
in more than proportionate increases in tax revenues, that is, in income tax elasticities higher 
than unity. 
Another example is offered by the behavior of income tax bases and revenues over 
the period 2003 to 2008. Figure 1 shows the annual growth rates of labour incomes, general 
taxable income, general tax liability and final tax
1. For years 2004, 2005 and 2006, the 
conventional view of a progressive income tax is confirmed: a given growth rate of labour 
income leads to higher growth rates for general taxable income and, most importantly, for 
tax liability and final tax in a sequential fashion. But for the years in which fiscal reforms 
were implemented (2003 and 2007) there is no a clear pattern for modelling growth in 
income tax revenue. Moreover, in 2008 general taxable income grew by 7.7%, but the final 
amount paid by taxpayers increased at a lower rate of 5.5%
2. In this context, the simple ratio 
between growth rates cannot be used as a proxy of income tax elasticity, unless a 
                                                 
1 As an indication of how representative these figures are, note that labour incomes are about 80% of total net 
income, general taxable income is 90% of total taxable income and general tax liability is almost 91% of total 
tax liability. The term “general” is used by the Spanish tax system to refer to all issues related to non-capital 
incomes. 
2 The situation is even more striking if the tax credit of €400 set up by the government for working and self-
employed taxpayers is considered, as final tax would fall by almost 3%. On the other hand, notice that when 
only the “general” part of tax liability is taken into account, tax revenues increase by 8.4%, which results in an 
elasticity –according to the method used by the Spanish tax authorities - of 1.09. In any event, this is far from 
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substantially lower (or even negative) sensitivity of tax revenues to changes in income is 
accepted, which would be counter to the traditional view of income tax as a progressive tax.  
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Source: Spanish National Tax Agency. 
 
Consequently, a different, more complex approach must be considered if the 
elasticity of income tax with respect to income increases is to be computed. Indeed, it is 
clear that tax revenues are affected not only by that elasticity but also by changes in tax 
policy, the dynamics of tax bases and taxpayers themselves and, finally, tax evasion. The 
issue is, therefore, to isolate income tax elasticity from the other three factors. 
In this context, this paper aims to determine the following: given a tax function, to 
what extent can changes in income tax revenues be explained by exogenous changes in 
income? We focus on the case of Spain over the period 2003-2008, as income tax there 
underwent a substantial reform in 2007. The general framework within which this paper is 
located is that used by Hutton and Lambert (1980), Fries et al. (1982) and Creedy and 
Gemmell (2002, 2003). 
There is very little evidence on Spain. To the best of our knowledge, there are only 
two papers that study this topic, using two different methodologies. The first one –de Castro 
et al. (2008)- deals only marginally with the elasticities of several Spanish taxes (with 
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budget balances. The values of income tax elasticity found in this paper are around 1.7 for 
1986-1992 and less than 1 for 1993-1998. Elasticity increases for 2003-2005, peaking at 1.9 
in this last year. 
Creedy and Sanz (2010) is an extensive, well-founded paper that provides a set of 
elasticity estimates for 15 Spanish regions and a country-wide aggregate. The authors use a 
large cross-sectional database of Spanish taxpayers for 2002 to generate a simulated 
population for 2007. They work with a broad concept of tax revenue elasticity (with respect 
to gross income) and distinguish between different sources of income (mainly from labour 
and capital). Their estimates range from 2.07 to 1.35, with the latter being the most reliable 
result.     
Our paper differs from that of Creedy and Sanz (2010) in a number of ways, in terms 
of both methods and results. We obtain results from the analytical resolution of the model 
and from a simulated sample of taxpayers, while Creedy and Sanz (2010) estimate their 
elasticities on the basis of a sample of actual individuals. The main caveat of their approach 
is that they have to update the only database available (dating from 2002) in order to use it 
in 2007, and this process may result in a sample whose basic statistics differ from those of 
the Spanish AT for that year. 
A second difference between the two papers lies in the very concept of income tax 
elasticity used. As mentioned above, Creedy and Sanz (2010) offer estimates of sensitivity 
of tax revenues with respect to gross income, while our paper takes taxable income as its 
reference. Consequently, they need to incorporate a number of ancillary elasticities to follow 
the complete sequence of schedular Spanish income tax. By contrast, our approach is quite 
simple because the starting point is taxable income. This considerably simplifies the 
computations and allows us to make a direct comparison with studies on other countries, 
where taxable income is widely used. 
Our results indicate that income tax elasticity with respect to taxable income is in 
line with previous estimates for other countries, though perhaps in the upper range. For the 
early part of the period (2003-2006) values of around 1.4 are found, while for the later part 
(2007-2008) elasticity increases to around 1.8. This increment in income tax elasticity after 
the 2007 fiscal reform persists under a number of changes in assumptions, such as non-
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of taxpayers, the use of tax credits and the consideration of the actual inflation rate in the 
updating of tax thresholds. After such a sensitivity analysis, it is clear that income tax 
elasticity has increased in Spain since 2007. 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the theoretical 
model. Section 3 introduces the data and the two methods used. Section 4 shows the results. 
Section 5 concludes and points out some policy implications.   
 
2.  THE MODEL 
This section is concerned with the theoretical framework used to estimate the revenue 
elasticities in Spanish taxes. Basically, we follow the general model by Creedy and 
Gemmell (2002, 2003) adapting it to fit the case of Spain
3. Principally, we distinguish 
between individual and aggregate revenue elasticities. Both theoretical approaches consider 
multi-step income tax functions, which have received considerable attention in earlier 
literature and also show a reasonable similarity with the real world. 
Denote by  ) ( i y T  the income tax paid by an individual i with a nominal income of i y . 
The revenue elasticity of income tax with respect to a change in income, 
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(1)
It can easily be seen that the numerator in (1) is the marginal tax rate ( i mtr ) while the 
denominator is the average tax rate ( i atr ). Income tax is usually a progressive tax, 
i mtr > i atr , so the elasticity is greater than 1, 
i i y T , η >1. 
Consider the following multi-step income tax function: 
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and so on. Setting  0 0 0 = = t a ,  ) ( i y T  can be written for k≥1 as: 
                                                 
3 In particular, we use an alternative specification of the multi-step tax function allowing for deductions not 
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for an individual i whose income falls into the kth tax bracket. It can be easily seen that the 
expression (3) can be rewritten as: 
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The interpretation of (5) and (6) is clear. Individual taxpayers face a single marginal tax rate 
k t , which is applied to net income in excess of a threshold 
'
k a . This threshold is specific for 
individuals in the kth tax bracket and reflects the structure of progressivity through marginal 
tax rates. 
Differentiation of (5) gives the change in the taxes paid by individual i when his/her 
income increases exogenously by 1 per cent: 
i k
i k
y T y a
dy da






= η  
 
(7)
It is easy to show that if the term  i k dy da /
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The assumption  0 /
' = i k dy da  means that an increase in  i y  does not affect the level of 
effective deductions 
'
k a . This is a strong hypothesis, not only in the context of income 
taxation but also for taxes on consumption (Fries et al. 1982). However, in our empirical 
analysis below, the treatment of effective deductions other than thresholds can be ignored; 
indeed, starting from the concept of taxable income, where both tax-deductible expenditures 
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methodological problems concerned with estimating responses of such as deductions with 
respect to income
4.  
Additionally, individual income tax elasticity with a multi-step income tax function 
can be decomposed as the change in the tax base as a result of a change in income (
i y B, η ) 
and the change in tax payments when the tax base is affected ( B Ti , η ): 
i i i i i y B y B B T y T , , , , η η η η = ⋅ = ,  (9)
where the last equality comes from the fact that  1 , = =
t
t
B Ti η . 
  An issue which becomes relevant in tax systems such as that of Spain is the presence 
of tax credits. The expressions above and below need to be arranged so as to take this 
feature into account. Formula (5) maintains the same formal appearance but 
'




















































where bi is the amount of tax credit. Expression (7) now becomes 
i k i k
i k
y T y t b y a
dy da







, η . 
So far the analysis has focused on individual elasticity, but for policy purposes it is 
the aggregate response to changes in income that is of most interest. Assume now that there 






 and total income 





i y y T T
1
. With a multi-step income tax function, and after some algebra 
manipulation, total differentiation of  y T  gives the following:  
































                                                 
4 Creedy and Gemmell (2003) obtain such elasticities for the UK using simple regression analyses, which 
probably suffer from econometric problems (see their Appendix B); Creedy and Sanz (2010), with a better 
econometric approach, report notably high results for Spain (see their Appendix D), which are far from the 
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Note that to compute the elasticity of aggregate tax revenue with respect to changes in 
aggregate income requires information on the distribution of income changes across the N 
individuals. In other words, a change in total income Y may affect each individual i 





 must be 
defined. 
 
2.1 Equiproportional income changes 
It is assumed firstly that all individuals experience an identical, proportionate increase in 
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(12)
Under this simple assumption, aggregate elasticity is a weighted average of individual 
elasticities, where the weights are given by the amount of tax paid by each taxpayer as a 
proportion of total revenue. 
 
2.2 The multi-step income tax function 
Consider again the income tax function specified in (2), with K+1 tax brackets and 
∞ = +1 K a . For the sake of simplicity, a continuous income distribution function  ) (y F  is 
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Using (5), total tax revenue can be rewritten under this continuous case as: 
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y  is the arithmetic mean income. Denoting by (.) 1 F  the first moment distribution 
function such that  ) ( 1 y F  is the proportion of total income obtained by those individuals with 
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* a  is the effective aggregate allowance: 
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The calculations involved in (17) require the use of convenient relationships between the 
moment distributions, which are usually assumed to be lognormal in type. 
 
2.3 Non-equiproportional income changes 






i ≠ , i.e. the increase in individual incomes is not 
the same for all members of the population. The key variable is then the elasticity of 
individual income with respect to aggregate income, which we denote by  Y yi , η . Rewritting 
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1 , = ∑ =
N
i Y yi η  holds. One way of learning the value of the new variable  Y yi , η  is to 
regress it on  ( ) μ β − − i y log 1 , where μ is the mean of the logarithms of income (see 
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3.  Methods and data 
This paper provides results for income tax elasticities using two different approaches. Given 
the previous theoretical framework, the first method computes the values of elasticities by 
analytically evaluating the above formulae. The second method obtains aggregate revenue 
elasticities on the basis of a numerical simulation for a large enough sample of taxpayers. 
The latter procedure has a number of advantages over the former, namely the treatment of 
non-equiproportional changes in income and the selected use of tax credits in the 
simulations.  
  The analytical method consists of evaluating expressions (16) and (17). Obviously, 
when the presence of tax credits is considered, 
'
k a  must be evaluated using expression (10). 
In any event, an assumption on income distribution must first be made. In line with 
mainstream research, we assume that incomes are lognormally distributed as  ( )
2 ,σ μ Ω , 
where µ and σ
2 are the mean and the variance of the logarithms of income respectively. To 
make it easier to evaluate such expressions, we take the simple relationships between the 
moment distributions in the case of lognormal distribution from Hart (1975). Particularly, it 
can be proved that  ( ) ( )
2 2 , , σ σ μ σ μ r r + Ω = Ω , where  () . r Ω  is the rth moment distribution 
function.  
Although (to best of our knowledge) there are no studies dealing with the distribution 
of Spanish taxpayers for 2003-2008, there are some indications that lognormal distribution 
is an appropriate assumption. First, Sanz et al (2009) provide empirical evidence that both 
the net income from labour (which is the main basis for the concept of general taxable 
income used here) and the tax credits linked to mortgage payments (which are considered 
below) followed a lognormal distribution in 2002
5. Further support for the lognormal 
assumption is given by the fact that the arithmetic mean of general taxable income computed 
from data is found to be very close to the arithmetic mean calculated from the simulated 
sample.  
  The income tax thresholds, the arithmetic mean of income and the mean of tax 
credits for all 10 income groups into which taxpayers are sorted (data from Income 
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Taxpayer Statistics of the AT) are available for each year. Since the number of thresholds is 
not the same as the number of taxpayer deciles, we group the amounts of tax credits to fit 
them to the thresholds; the reasonably good match between the groups of taxpayers 
according to general taxable income and the 10 income groups used in the statistics made 
this task easier (and increased the confidence level). The only tax credit considered in this 
paper is that for money invested in the purchase or rehabilitation of housing
6.  
A common value of 0.5 is taken as the variance of the log of income for the whole 
period; this is the figure used by Creedy and Gemmell (2002) in their numerical exercises 
and is very close to those used by Creedy and Gemmell (2003) for the UK in the nineties. In 
any event, a sensitivity analysis of our estimates of aggregate elasticity with respect to 
changes in the variance of log of income σ
2 was carried out on the basis of analytical 
methods. The results are discussed below.    
The above theoretical model also allows the aggregate effective marginal and 











⎛ , i.e. as an income-
share weighted average of individual marginal tax rates, the aggregate effective average tax 
rate is obtained on the basis of expression 
ATR
MTR
y T = , η , where the capital letters refer to 
aggregate concepts. Obviously, in the continuous case, summation of individuals must be 
replaced by an integral and the weighted average is computed using the moment distribution 
functions evaluated at threshold values.  
Additionally, we applied an alternative method based on generating a simulated 
population of taxpayers who pay their taxes and, hence, give individual values of  i mtr  and 
i atr . When their individual elasticities are conveniently weighted, a value for aggregate 
elasticity is obtained. The details of this simulation method are explained below. 
First, we generate annual samples of 20,000 individuals, assuming a lognormal 
distribution of income, whose arithmetic mean incomes and variance of log of incomes are 
the same as in the analytical case. Each of these samples contains both taxpayers who are 
entitled to use tax credits related to investment in housing and taxpayers who are not; the 
                                                 
6 They affect a range of between 36% and 46% of total taxpayers. Remaining tax credits are not very 
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proportions of each type of individuals are given by the data from the Income Taxpayer 
Statistics of the AT. Second, each individual faces the corresponding tax rates and 
thresholds of income tax, defining individual marginal and average tax rates; the distribution 
of tax credits across entitled taxpayers also follows the information from the Income 
Taxpayer Statistics. By contrast with the analytical case, this simulation approach allows for 
a better match between the official data, which are grouped in 10 income brackets as 
mentioned above, and the assignment of different tax credits to different individuals. 
Finally, individual tax rates are weighted to give the aggregate tax rates, which lead to the 
estimates of revenue elasticities. 
Moreover, with the simulation method income tax elasticities can be computed 






i ≠ . In 
this sense, we study what happens to the aggregate revenue elasticity for each year if the 
poorest taxpayers increase their incomes more (or less) than the richest ones. The poverty 
line is set at the first threshold (e.g. €13,800 of taxable income in 2003); people below this 
threshold are considered as poor. The parameter modified to take this issue into account is 
Y yi , η  in expression (19). Equalising (disequalising) changes mean a value of this elasticity of 
more (less) than 1 for poor taxpayers; given the constraint that  1
1 , = ∑ =
N
i Y yi η , the values for 
rich individuals will be just the opposite, and their magnitudes will also depend on the 
proportion of taxpayers below the poverty line.            
A few words must be said about the 2007 Spanish income tax reform. We focus here 
on the main changes related to the estimates of tax revenue elasticity under the simple 
theoretical model that we use as our framework:  
-  The tax scale applicable to the general component of taxable income was 
reduced from five brackets to four. 
-  The highest marginal tax rate was decreased from 45% to 43%. The rest of 
marginal tax rates remain unchanged at 24%, 28% and 37%.  
-  Personal and family allowances were increased. Since 2007 they have been 
included as general rule in the first income bracket, which is taxed at a zero 
rate. Similarly, given the findings by Sanz et al. (2009), the new treatment 
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24% (the minimum tax rate) of the amount of such allowances
7. Until 2007, 
they were deducted from the tax base, which decreased the progressivity of 
taxation. 
-  Additionally, in order to support household purchasing power, an additional 
tax credit of €400 was granted to working and self-employed taxpayers in 
2008. 
The extent of the thresholds were modified every year –except in 2004- to take the 
effect of inflation on nominal magnitudes into account, according to government forecasts 
of price increases (which were usually lower than the actual increases). Table 1 reports the 
thresholds and marginal tax rates in place in 2003-2008 for levying general taxable income. 
Finally, it is worth noting that both the methodological approaches used take into account 
the presence of a housing tax credit, which consists –as a general rule- of a credit of 15% of 




Table 1: Income tax structure, 2003-2008 
  Income tax thresholds  Marginal tax rates 
  1 a   2 a   3 a   4 a   5 a   1 t   2 t   3 t   4 t   5 t  
2003  1  4000  13800  25800  45000 0.15 0.24 0.28 0.37 0.45 
2004  1  4000  13800  25800  45000 0.15 0.24 0.28 0.37 0.45 
2005  1  4080  14076  26316  45900 0.15 0.24 0.28 0.37 0.45 
2006  1  4161  14357  26842  46818 0.15 0.24 0.28 0.37 0.45 
2007  1  17360  32360  52360  -  0.24 0.28 0.37 0.43  - 
2008  1  17707  33007  53407  -  0.24 0.28 0.37 0.43  - 
Note: Decimal values have been ignored in the case of thresholds. Source: Spanish National Tax Administration. 
     
Table 2 shows the mean income figures and the tax credits linked to housing 
investments by tax brackets. As mentioned above, official statistics give information on all 
tax variables by deciles of net income. Consequently, both these tax credits and the personal 
                                                 
7 Sanz et al. (2009) find that for 99.22% of income tax returns the minimum allowance replicates a fixed tax 
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Housing tax credits 
1
st threshold 
Housing tax credits 
2
nd threshold 
Housing tax credits 
3
rd threshold 
Housing tax credits 
4
th threshold 
Housing tax credits 
5
th threshold 
2003  14050 648  705  871  1059  1390 
2004  14548 651  702  861  1045  1313 
2005  15282 679  726  872  1050  1314 
2006  16206 730  773  908  1076  1382 
2007  18067 663  822  910  1051  - 
2008  18765 713  849  932  1131  - 
Note: Decimal values have been ignored. Source: Spanish National Tax Administration 
 
 
Table 3: Personal and family allowances (by tax brackets) 
  Personal and family 
allowances. 1
st threshold 
Personal and family 
allowances. 2
nd threshold 
Personal and family 
allowances. 3
rd threshold 
Personal and family 
allowances. 4
th threshold 
2007  966 1599  1610  1625 
2008  976 1626  1640  1672 
Note: Decimal values have been ignored. Source: Spanish National Tax Administration 
 
4.  Results 
Given the two methodological approaches described above, a set of estimates of tax revenue 
elasticities are reported here that distinguish whether tax credits are considered or not. Table 
4 shows the aggregate income tax elasticities estimated under different assumptions and 
methods. The two first columns refer to a situation in which no taxpayers have access to tax 
credits related to housing purchases; the next two columns deal exclusively with individuals 
who benefit from such tax credits; finally, column (V) reports the results of the simulation in 
which both types of taxpayer are taken into account, in a proportion equal to their weights as 
per real-world data.  
                                                                                                                                                      
8 Before 2007, this percentage could be higher under certain circumstances, for instance when using mortgages 
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Table 4. Aggregate income tax elasticities 
  (I) (II)  (III)  (IV)  (V) 
2003  1.2643 1.2630 1.6580 1.6208  1.3809 
2004  1.2659 1.2647 1.6377 1.5993  1.3995 
2005  1.2673 1.2680 1.6261 1.6024  1.4011 
2006  1.2691 1.2677 1.6234 1.5885  1.3978 
2007  1.6295 1.6423 2.0578 1.9317  1.7358 
2008  1.8305 1.7821 2.4455 2.0850  1.8752 
Notes: (I): Analytically without tax credits; (II): Simulation without tax credits; (III): Analytically with tax 
credits; (IV): Simulation with tax credits; (V): Simulation with and without tax credits. 
 
Whichever family of estimates is considered, it is clear that the 2007 fiscal reform 
yields a substantial increase in income tax elasticity. For the simulation based on a sample of 
individuals with and without tax credits
9 -column (V)- the estimates range from around 1.4 
for 2003-2006 to between 1.7 and (almost) 1.9 in 2007 and 2008. The main explanation 
behind this is that from 2007 onwards income tax includes a new tax credit (linked to 
personal and minimum allowances) which decreases tax liability, as explained above. As a 
result, although the marginal tax rates are slightly lower (see below) there are major changes 
in average tax rates, which decrease by more than 20 per cent from 2006 to 2007. 
    When no tax credits related to housing investments are considered –columns (I) 
and (II)- the coincidence between the analytical approach and the simulation method is very 
high until 2007. This feature has previously been pointed out by Creedy and Gemmell 
(2002, 2003) for other cases. However, after the 2007 fiscal reform slight differences arise 
due to the fact that the simulation procedure does not consider those taxpayers whose tax 
liability is negative or zero after tax credits are applied (personal and family allowances and 
the €400 tax credit in 2008
10). By contrast, the analytical approach has no way of removing 
those individuals from the general computation of elasticity. 
                                                 
9 In a sense, the elasticities reported in column (V) can be considered as the benchmark values and those which 
are most reliable as long as they are based on a realistic enough composition of the taxpayer sample.  
10 As a result of this deduction of €400, which was not applicable in 2007, the discrepancies between the two 
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In the case of elasticities estimated under the assumption that all taxpayers benefit 
from tax credits linked to housing investments, higher elasticities are obviously obtained. 
Again, the underlying explanation is the major reduction in the average tax rate which takes 
place when such tax credits are considered. Also, the wider gap between the two approaches 
from the 2007 tax income reform onwards is based on the number of individuals who, after 
facing the tax schedule and applying the corresponding tax credits, show a negative (or null) 
final tax amount. These taxpayers are ignored in the simulation method but are considered in 
the analytical one. Given the major importance in quantitative terms of tax credits after 
2007, a significant discrepancy between the two procedures is expected (and confirmed) for 
the last two years.   
An indication of the good match between the performance of our simulation and data 
from the AT comes precisely from the number of individuals whose final tax is negative. 
The numerical simulation finds that 18 per cent of the 20,000 potential taxpayers in 2008 
had to pay no taxes. Data from tax statistics indicate a percentage of about 23 per cent that 
year. The two figures are relatively close if it is taken into account that they are not directly 
comparable (the data from the AT include not only the taxes to be paid on labour incomes -
as in our exercise- but also those levied on income from capital).  
Our estimates can be connected with those found previously by other authors. 
Creedy and Sanz (2010), using a different approach from ours, obtain a figure of 1.35 taking 
into account different sources of income, eligible expenditures, allowances and tax credits. 
When only two sources of income are used, the elasticity of tax revenue with respect to 
gross income rises to 2.10 in 2007.   
A number of similar papers with close results can be quoted for a variety of samples 
and periods. Dorrington (1974) gives figures of between 2.43 and 2.10 for the UK for 1963-
1971. Hutton and Lambert (1980) find elasticities of between 1.91 and 1.83 for the same 
country in 1973-1978. Also for the UK, Johnson and Lambert (1989) provide estimates 
ranging between 1.5 and 1.6 for the early eighties. Using cross-section regressions at US 
state level for 1949, 1959, 1969 and 1979, Ram (1991) estimates elasticities of around 1.6; 
slightly lower values (1.3-1.4) are obtained when the 1980s are analysed. Creedy and 
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Seeking reasons for the substantial difference between income tax elasticities in the 
periods 2003-2006 and 2007-2008 other than tax policy changes arising from fiscal reform, 
we noted that the share of taxpayers entitled to benefit from the tax credit for housing 
investments in 2006 was higher than in 2007 (46 and 37% respectively). A lower proportion 
of beneficiaries of tax credits means a higher average tax rate, so this change implies a lower 
income tax elasticity, which is just the opposite to what our results indicate.  
Consequently, the increase in estimated elasticity between 2006 and 2007-2008 
cannot be attributed to a greater use of housing tax credits. If the elasticity of income tax in 
2007 is computed using the same distribution of beneficiaries of tax credits as in 2006, the 
values obtained are 1.6400 (to be compared to column (II), simulation without tax credits), 
1.9400 (column (IV), simulation with tax credits) and 1.7624 (column (V), simulation with 
and without tax credits). 
A final comment on Table 4 is that after the 2007 reform the differences between the 
estimated benchmark elasticity (column (V)) and those estimates using samples with all 
taxpayers with tax credits in housing or all taxpayers without such tax credits are smaller. 
The benchmark figures are always higher than those which consider only taxpayers without 
tax credits and always lower than the estimated elasticities with all individuals using tax 
credits, but both differences are smaller in 2007 than in 2006. In a sense, the design of the 
new income tax inserts a convergence force between the two approaches as long as a new 
tax credit (related to personal and family allowances), which decreases final tax liability, is 
included in 2007. This is especially true in the model without tax credits linked to housing 
investments. Nevertheless, the way in which the minimum personal and familiar allowances 
are taken into account is the same in both models. 
 
Table 5: Elasticities with non-equiproportional changes 
  2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
Equalising changes  1.3675 1.3859 1.3893 1.3865 1.7197 1.8565 
Disequalising changes  1.3942 1.4130 1.4130 1.4091 1.7520 1.8939 
 
  The above theoretical model allows us to control for the impact on tax revenues of 







   17
includes the term  Y yi , η  to reflect how sensitive individual i’s income is to an increase in the 
aggregate income of country Y. As explained in Section 3, the two scenarios (equalising and 
disequalising) refer to (more than or less than proportional) changes in the income of the 
group with the lowest incomes; obviously, this change affects the income of the richest 
taxpayers inversely. 
  Table 5 provides a synthesis of the results, showing only the estimates of tax 
elasticities obtained when the poorest individuals see their income increase by 1 per cent 
more than the aggregate income (equalising), and vice versa (disequalising)
11. It is clear that 
income tax elasticity diminishes when an equalising change takes place, and the opposite 
happens when disequalising movements are considered.  
The reason for this lies in the progressivity of income tax. Individuals with higher 
levels of income face higher marginal tax rates and, consequently, show higher income tax 
elasticity; hence, when relatively rich taxpayers experience an increase in their income 
higher than that of the poorest, the taxes that they pay will increase by more than the final 
tax paid by the poorest. This leads to a greater weight of the higher individual elasticities of 
the richest taxpayers than the lower values of the poorest. This results in higher aggregate 
income tax elasticity when disequalising changes take place. This finding is in line with 
previous references, particularly Creedy and Sanz (2010).      
  Moreover, we have found that the gap between the benchmark elasticity –the figures 
in column (V) of table 4- and those from non-equiproportional changes in income widens 
after the 2007 fiscal reform. Moreover, the differences become greater as the intensity of 
equalising or disequalising changes increases. That is, the distance between the benchmark 
elasticity in 2006 (1.39) and the elasticity computed under the equalising assumption (say 
2 . 1 , = Y yi η ) also in 2006 (1.17) is smaller than in 2007 (1.73 versus 1.41, respectively) for 
the same equalising situation. The same is true in the case of disequalising changes.   
  Leaving aside non-equiproportional changes in income growth, the issues concerned 
with income inequality and aggregate income tax elasticity have not been studied on an 
empirical basis. To the best of our knowledge, the only reference on this point is a paper by 
Hutton and Lambert (1982), who offer a numerical simulation which has no direct link to 
                                                 
11 Results obtained with other figures for the intensity of (dis)equalising, e.g. 2 per cent, 5 per cent, 10 per cent 
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data from the real world
12. With the aim of covering this gap at least in part, we compute 
aggregate income tax elasticities using our analytical approach, taking the empirical 
information for each year and different values of σ
2. 
 
Table 6: Sensitivity of tax revenue elasticity to income inequality 
σ
2 2006  2007  2008 
0.2 1.6159  2.1156  2.5332 
0.3 1.6256  2.1036  2.5108 
0.4 1.6274  2.0830  2.4808 
0.5  1.6234  2.0578  2.4455 
0.6 1.6156  2.0307  2.4077 
0.7 1.6053  2.0032  2.3692 
0.8 1.5937  1.9762  2.3310 
0.9 1.5812  1.9501  2.2940 
1 1.5685  1.9250  2.2584 
1.1 1.5556  1.9011  2.2243 
1.2 1.5429  1.8785  2.1920 
1.3 1.5304  1.8569  2.1613 
1.4 1.5183  1.8365  2.1321 
1.5 1.5065  1.8172  2.1045 
 
Table 6 shows the results for 2006-2008 taking the model with tax credits linked to 
housing investment as a reference. In fact, the inverse relationship between income 
inequality and income tax elasticities found by Hutton and Lambert (1982) is also detected 
here for the Spanish case
13. The higher the income inequality, the lower the income tax 
elasticity. This feature becomes more intense after the 2007 reform and is even increasing in 
time (see how the ratios between our benchmark value with σ
2 =0.5 and those reported for 
different σ
2  are lower for 2007 than for 2008). 
However, when the model without tax credits linked to housing investments is 
considered, there is not such a clear pattern as in the case with tax credits. In fact, although 
the results are not reported here
14, the univocal inverse relationship between income 
inequality and tax revenue elasticity does not hold for values of σ
2 below 0.5. For higher 
                                                 
12 Based on an econometric approach, Dye and McGuire (1991) provide evidence which confirms that income 
inequality is not a trivial issue for estimating income tax elasticities.  
13 Strictly speaking, this is true except for the elasticity computed for 2006 when σ
2 =0.2. According to the 
above relationship, a higher value for this elasticity would be expected here.   
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levels of inequality, our results are in line, quantitatively and qualitatively, with those found 
for the model with housing tax credits.   
  One of the most significant tax policy issues deals with the impact of modifying 
thresholds to adapt them to inflation. As is well-known, when thresholds are not updated to 
take price increases into account there is fiscal drag, which has implications for income tax 
revenues and, consequently, for estimates of tax revenue elasticities.  
  In this sense, we analytically compute the elasticities of Spanish income tax in 2008 
and 2005 using tax brackets whose amounts are updated according to the inflation which 
effectively took place. These results are compared in Table 7 to those obtained previously 
applying a lower growth rate of price increase, particularly that forecast by the government.  
 
Table 7. Tax revenue elasticities with adjustments for inflation 
  2005  2005 with real inflation 2008  2008 with real inflation
Without tax credits  1.267 1.266 1.830 1.828 
With tax credits  1.626 1.625 2.445 2.442 
  
Although elasticities decrease when thresholds are adapted to real inflation, the 
differences with the previously estimated figures are insignificant. The discrepancies arise at 
the level of the third decimal, so it can be concluded here that the impact of fiscal drag on 
elasticities is negligible. Obviously, in a context with higher inflation rates, strongly 
discordant with those used by the government for updating tax bracket limits, a decrease in 
estimated elasticities is to be expected.   
This comes from the fact that increasing the thresholds makes it more unlikely that 
an exogenous increase in income will lead to a higher mtr (indeed, the mtr will remain 
unchanged for many taxpayers) whereas the atr will be higher when the individual is richer. 
This is due to the mere presence of thresholds, which make income tax progressive and, 
consequently, increase the atr even within the same tax brackets.  
However, using the analytical method can be proved that a tax function where the 
value of the first threshold substantially deviates from 0 does not yield lower elasticities 
when the thresholds are updated according to the real inflation rate. This is what would 
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Table 8. Effective marginal and average tax rates 
















2003  0.2994 0.2371  0.2953  0.1822  0.2978  0.2157 
2004  0.3035 0.2400  0.2997  0.1866  0.3023  0.2230 
2005  0.3045 0.2401  0.3009  0.1878  0.3028  0.2161 
2006  0.3092 0.2439  0.3080  0.1939  0.3086  0.2208 
2007  0.3006 0.1830  0.2854  0.1478  0.2949  0.1699 
2008  0.2959 0.1661  0.2782  0.1334  0.2896  0.1545 
 
  A minor question here, which stems from the computation of income tax elasticities, 
is the discussion on effective marginal and average tax rates. Strictly speaking, we do not 
offer the standard effective tax rates used in papers focusing on redistributive implications 
of fiscal reforms. Rather, we report the underlying tax rates supporting our estimates of tax 
revenue elasticities (in a similar way to Hutton and Lambert 1980). Recall that we use the 
concept of taxable labour income (rather than gross income), leaving aside a number of tax 
credits which may have impact on income inequality and redistribution through taxes. 
  In general, the 2007 fiscal reform breaks a slight upward trend in both tax rates over 
the period 2003-2006. This change is especially intense in the case of the average tax rate, 
which decreases by more than 5 percentage points between 2006 and 2007. The reduction in 
the marginal tax rate is stronger in the model with tax credits for housing investments while 
the average tax rate falls especially in the model without such tax credits. 
 
5.  Concluding remarks 
This paper estimates the elasticities of Spanish income tax in 2003-2008, a period which 
includes the substantial fiscal reform that took place in 2007. The standard wisdom sees 
income tax as a progressive tax, with marginal tax rates higher than average tax rates, so that 
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However, as long as government resources are influenced by a number of factors, data may 
hide useful information. This is the case of Spanish income tax revenues, where the official 
reports by the AT show elasticities below 1 for some recent years.     
  Our aim here is to isolate the impact of progressivity on tax revenues, excluding 
other factors such as policy changes, tax evasion and so on. Hence, using two different 
methods (an analytical approach and a simulation procedure), we compute the extent to 
which tax revenues increase when taxpayers’ income goes up marginally. We take into 
account some particular features of the Spanish tax system, namely the presence of tax 
credits for purchasing houses and the implementation of a major fiscal reform, which 
decreased tax rates and introduced personal and family allowances treated as tax credits, 
among other things. 
  Our results show that aggregate income tax elasticities range from 1.4 for 2003-2006 
to 1.7-1.8 for 2007 and 2008. Clearly, the 2007 tax reform raised the sensitivity of income 
tax revenues to exogenous changes in income taxpayers. Obviously, these results vary 
according to the way in which housing tax credits are considered (higher elasticities when 
such tax credits are extensively used). 
  These findings are compared with others obtained by modifying some of the initial 
assumptions. If non-equiproportional changes in taxpayers’ income are considered, 
equalising changes which increase the income of poor individuals more are seen to reduce 
aggregate income tax elasticity, and vice versa. Analytically, we also conclude that the 
higher the income inequality, the lower the income tax elasticity, although this result must 
be qualified under certain circumstances. Moreover, we show that correcting for fiscal drag 
from inflation decreases elasticity only insignificantly. These two procedures also allow the 
average and marginal effective tax rates to be obtained, and confirm that the increase in 
aggregate income tax elasticity after 2007 is supported by a more intense decrease in 
average tax rates than in marginal tax rates. 
We believe that investigating aggregate tax elasticities is a relevant issue for many 
developed countries. As is well-known, the need to increase government resources is crucial 
in current fiscal consolidation processes. In regard to income tax in particular, we know that 
increasing tax rates may have substantial efficiency costs; and the war against tax evasion 
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Hence, the hope of many governments lies in capturing the increase in tax revenues that 
stems from economic recovery. Therefore, it is crucial to have estimates (which are as 
precise and robust as possible) of aggregate tax elasticities to draw up credible, realistic 
plans for cutting budget deficits. 
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